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Abstract 
It has been claimed that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the 
future are intimately related. We sought support for this proposition by examining whether 
individual differences in dimensions that have been shown to affect memory for past events 
similarly influence the experience of projecting oneself into the future. We found that individuals 
with a higher capacity for visual imagery experienced more visual and other sensory details both 
when remembering past events and when imagining future events. In addition, individuals who 
habitually use suppression to regulate their emotions experienced fewer sensory, contextual, and 
emotional details when representing both past and future events, while the use of reappraisal had 
no effect on either kind of events. These findings are consistent with the view that mental time 
travel into the past and into the future relies on similar mechanisms. 
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Individual differences in the phenomenology of mental time travel: The effect of vivid visual 
imagery and emotion regulation strategies 
 
As humans, we frequently engage in “mental time travel,” remembering our past 
experiences and projecting ourselves into possible future events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; 
Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). When traveling backwards in time, we may remember an 
event with considerable detail, for instance by “seeing” in our mind the location where the event 
took place and the persons and objects that were present, remembering what we thought during 
that event, feeling what we felt, and so forth. These details give us the subjective experience of 
mentally reliving a past event—a feeling of “warmth and intimacy” as William James wrote 
(James, 1890)—which is the hallmark of episodic memory (Tulving, 2002; Wheeler et al., 1997). 
This subjective experience has been intensely investigated in recent years, by asking people to 
rate the phenomenal characteristics of their memories (e.g., Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 
1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) or to report their states of awareness during memory 
retrieval (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985). By contrast, surprisingly few studies have 
examined the subjective experience associated with projecting oneself forward in time to pre-
experience an event, or what has been called “episodic future thinking” (Atance & O’Neill, 
2001).  
Suddendorf and Corballis (1997; see also Suddendorf & Busby, 2003, 2005) argued that 
mental time travel into the future and into the past may employ very similar mechanisms. 
Memories for past events are transient mental representations constructed from specific sensory-
perceptual details, as well as more general semantic knowledge (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). Similarly, imagining future events involves combining some basic elements (e.g., actors, 
objects, and actions), some of which are extrapolations from past events while others come from 
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general semantic knowledge, to generate potential scenarios. In addition, mental time travel, 
whether it be into the past or the future, crucially involves the notion of experiencing the self in 
time or what Tulving calls “autonoetic” consciousness, which is “the kind of consciousness that 
mediates an individual’s awareness of his or her existence and identity in subjective time 
extending from the personal past through the present to the personal future” (Tulving, 1985, p. 1). 
Data that are consistent with these propositions can be summarized as follows. First, 
developmental research suggests that episodic memory and episodic future thinking emerge 
approximately at the same time (around age three to four; Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Levine, 2004; 
Suddendorf & Busby, 2005). Second, patients with brain damage who are unable to recall their 
personal past typically have difficulties in imagining possible future experiences (Klein, Loftus, 
& Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985). Third, some neuroimaging data suggest that common 
cerebral bases might underlie thinking about the future and past (Okuda et al., 2003). Finally, the 
factors that influence the phenomenal characteristics associated with remembering, such as the 
emotional valence of the events and their temporal distance from the present, have similar effects 
on the phenomenal characteristics associated with projecting oneself into the future 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). 
Thus, although this is a relatively new area of research, the existing data are consistent 
with the view that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the 
future are intimately related. Our goal in this study was to further examine this relationship, 
focusing specifically on whether certain individual differences affect mental time travel into the 
past and into the future in the same way. Recent data indicate that some personality dimensions 
are related to the phenomenology of memory. Rubin and Siegler (2004) found that, of all the 
domains and facets of personality assessed by the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 
1992), openness to feelings showed by far the strongest relation to the phenomenology of 
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memory for past events, correlating with measures of belief in the accuracy of memories, sense of 
recollection, amount of sensory details, and feeling of emotions while remembering. Arguing that 
the opposite of openness to feelings is the suppression of emotions, Rubin and Siegler related 
their findings to those of Richards and Gross (2000), who found that people who habitually 
suppress the expression of their emotions (a) report having a poorer memory for conversations, 
and (b) recall emotion regulation episodes less well than people with a lower emotion 
suppression tendency. By contrast, people who habitually regulate their emotions by altering how 
they think about the situations (i.e., reappraisal) had no better or worse memory than people who 
do not habitually reappraise (Richards & Gross, 2000). Together, the findings of Rubin and 
Siegler (2004) and Richards and Gross (2000) thus suggest that the subjective experience 
associated with remembering past events is affected by individual differences in emotion 
processing, and particularly the tendency to regulate emotion by means of suppression. Our first 
goal in this study was to examine whether the subjective experience associated with projecting 
oneself into the future is also affected by individual differences in the use of emotion regulation 
strategies.  
The second individual difference dimension we were interested in concerns the vividness 
of visual imagery. Most philosophers and psychologists consider that visual imagery plays a key 
role in memory for past events (see Brewer, 1996), and neuropsychological data support that 
claim, by showing that damage to areas known to support visual imagery can, as a secondary 
consequence, result in an impairment of memory (Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Greenberg & 
Rubin, 2003). According to Conway (2001), a crucial function of episodic memory is to keep 
track of ongoing goal processing, and mental images, especially visual ones, play an important 
role in representing information about personal goals (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). 
Episodic future thinking is also closely related to personal goals. Indeed, projecting oneself into 
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the future involves representing future states of the self that are both related to current goals (i.e., 
representing episodes of achievement of or failure to achieve personal goals) and plausible with 
regard to the present state of the self (Atance & O’Neill, 2001). As in the case of memories for 
past events, it is likely that visual imagery plays an important role in representing future states of 
the self. If this is the case, individual differences in visual imagery should be related to both 





One hundred and eight undergraduates at the University of Liège participated in the study. 
Data from six participants had to be discarded because there were missing values in their 
questionnaires. The reported results are from the remaining 102 participants (68 of whom were 
female). Their mean age was 22 years (SD = 2.8 years). 
 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were tested individually, in two sessions that were separated by a one-week 
interval. During each session, an initial introduction explained that they would be asked to 
remember some events that they had personally experienced in the past or to imagine some 
events that might happen to them in the future. Half of the participants were asked to remember 
past events during Session 1 and to imagine future events during Session 2, while this order was 
reversed for the other participants. Detailed written instructions explained that the events 
participants were to recall or imagine had to be precise and specific (i.e., they had to take place in 
a specific place at a specific time and they had to last a few minutes or hours but not more than a 
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day); some examples were provided to illustrate what would or would not be considered as a 
specific event. For future events, it was also mentioned that the events had to be things that might 
reasonably happen to them in the future. Participants were asked to remember seven past events 
and to imagine seven future events from different temporal windows: an event that 
happened/might happen today, an event that happened yesterday/that might happen tomorrow, an 
event that happened one week ago/that might happen in one week, an event that happened one 
month ago/that might happen in one month, an event that happened one year ago/that might 
happen in one year, an event that happened five years ago/that might happen in five years, and an 
event that happened ten years ago/that might happen in ten years. For each event, participants 
were asked to try to remember/imagine the event in as much detail as possible (i.e., 
remembering/imagining the setting and course of the events, the persons and objects that 
were/would be present, and so forth) in order to mentally “re-experience” (or “pre-experience”) 
it. Immediately after having remembered/imagined each event, participants wrote a brief 
description of the event and rated their subjective experience with 7-point rating scales adapted 
from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (Johnson et al., 1988) and the Autobiographical 
Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003). The rating scales that were used in this study are 
shown in Table 1 (note that indexes for “autonoetic consciousness,” “other sensory details,” and 
“spatial context” were computed by averaging responses to two or three items).  
Individual differences in vividness of visual imagery were assessed with the Vividness of 
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), which comprises 16 items referring to different situations 
that the subject is asked to visualize, rating image vividness on a 5-point scale (Marks, 1973). We 
used a French version of the VVIQ that has been used in a previous study (Campos, Chiva, & 
Moreau, 2000) but, as suggested by McKelvie (1995), the numerical values on the 5-point rating 
scale initially proposed by Marks were reversed, so that higher ratings represent greater 
Mental time travel, visual imagery, and emotion regulation 8
vividness. In the present study, the Cronbach’s alpha was .85. Participants also completed the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), which assesses individual 
differences in the habitual use of two common emotion regulation strategies: cognitive 
reappraisal (ERQ-R) and expressive suppression (ERQ-S). The ERQ comprises 10 items (6 for 
the reappraisal scale and 4 for the suppression scale) that are rated on a 7-point scale so that a 
high score indicates frequent use of reappraisal/suppression. For the purpose of this study, a 
French adaptation of the ERQ was done using the back-translation method. The two authors and 
three other psychologists independently translated the ERQ into French and these translations 
were compared. The five translations were nearly identical; the slight differences were discussed 
until agreement had been reached. Then, a bilingual translator translated the French ERQ back 
into English; no semantic differences were noted between the two questionnaire forms. Similarly 
to Gross and John (2003), an exploratory factor analysis revealed no evidence for a single, 
general factor; instead, the scree test suggested two factors. These two factors accounted for 53% 
of the variance, and the maximum loading was found on the correct factor for each item. Also 
consistent with Gross and John, the ERQ-R and ERQ-S were independent (r = -.07). Alphas were 
.73 and .78 for the ERQ-R and ERQ-S, respectively, which are similar to those reported by Gross 
and John. The VVIQ significantly correlated with the ERQ-R (r = .24, p < .05) but not with the 
ERQ-S (r = –.15). 
 
Results 
Content of the events 
To give an idea of the content of the events that were remembered and imagined in the 
present study, we classified the descriptions of events into broad categories. Memories for past 
events involved episodes at parties (22%), episodes at school (16%), conversations with a relative 
Mental time travel, visual imagery, and emotion regulation 9
or close friend (16%), episodes during leisure activities (12%), romantic episodes (9%), travel 
(8%), accidents or illnesses (6%), and shopping (5%); 6% of the events could not be classified in 
these categories. Imagined future events involved episodes related to school or work (24%), 
episodes at parties (15%), the birth of a child or episodes with a child (12%), episodes during 
leisure activities (10%), romantic episodes (9%), conversations with a relative or close friend 
(9%), travel (8%), a move (6%), and shopping (3%); 4% of the events could not be classified in 
these categories. 
 
Ratings for phenomenal characteristics 
For both past and future events, the ratings of the seven events were averaged to provide 
one value for each phenomenal characteristic for each participant. As can be seen from Table 2, 
memories for past events contained more visual and other sensory details than representations of 
future events, were clearer concerning spatial context and temporal information, were formulated 
to a greater extent in words, were more coherent, and were remembered more with a field 
perspective. Future events were rated as being more positive and more important than past 
events. The other rating scales did not differ between past and future events. 
Multiple regression analyses were used to assess the influence of individual differences in 
visual imagery and emotion regulation strategies on the phenomenal characteristics associated 
with mental time travel into the past and into the future. The independent variables were the 
scores on the VVIQ, ERQ-R, and ERQ-S, while the dependent variables were the ratings for each 
phenomenal characteristic. Standardized beta weights and R2 values are shown in Table 3. For 
both past and future events, the VVIQ significantly predicted the amount of visual details and 
other sensory details, indicating that participants with more vivid visual imagery created 
representations of past and future events that contained more visual and other sensory details. The 
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VVIQ also predicted the clarity of temporal information for past events while, for future events, it 
predicted the clarity of spatial context, the feeling of emotions, and the intensity and personal 
importance of the events. 
The two emotion regulation strategies had very different effects on the subjective 
experience associated with projecting oneself into the past and into the future: while the ERQ-R 
did not predict any of the phenomenal characteristics, the ERQ-S was negatively related to most 
of them. For both past and future events, individuals who were high in expressive suppression 
reported lower ratings for autonoetic consciousness, visual details, spatial context, feeling 
emotions, intensity, and the extent to which the events were represented in words. For past 
events, the ERQ-S also predicted story coherence while, for future events, it predicted other 
sensory details and temporal information, with participants who were higher in expressive 
suppression reporting lower ratings in all the cases.  
 
Discussion 
Our goal in this study was to examine the relationship between mental time travel into the 
past and into the future from an individual differences point of view, assessing whether individual 
differences in visual imagery and emotion regulation strategies affect the phenomenal 
characteristics associated with memory and with projecting oneself into the future in the same 
way. The content of the past and future events evoked by the participants involved rather similar 
domains (school or work, parties, conversations with relatives or friends, romantic relationships, 
travel), with the exception of the birth of a child or episodes with a child, which were only 
evoked when imagining the future. Overall, these past and future events formed a rather 
representative sample of the different kinds of events that characterize human life.  
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With regard to the phenomenal characteristics associated with mental time travel, we 
found that participants experienced more visual and other sensory details, more words, a clearer 
representation of contextual (spatial and temporal) information, a more coherent story, and 
perceived the event more from a field perspective when remembering past events than when 
imagining future events. These findings are consistent with a previous study about mental time 
travel (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004) and with studies that showed that memories for 
real events contain more sensory and contextual details than memories for imagined events (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 1988; McGinnis & Roberts, 1996). In addition, the future events evoked by the 
participants were rated as being more positive and more important than remembered events, 
which supports the view that most people have an optimistic bias towards the future (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), for instance predicting that they would be more likely than their peers to 
experience positive events in the future (e.g., having a good job, owning their own home) and 
less likely to experience negative occurrences (e.g., being fired from a job, divorce; Weinstein, 
1980). 
Although representations of future events were less detailed than representations of past 
events, the effects of individual differences in visual imagery and emotion regulation on these 
two kinds of representations were remarkably similar. For both past and future events, individual 
differences in the vividness of visual imagery were positively related to the amount of visual and 
other sensory details experienced while representing the events. In addition, the habitual use of 
emotion suppression strategies was associated with a decrease in most of the phenomenal 
characteristics associated with both past and future events, while the use of reappraisal was 
unrelated to these characteristics. These findings provide new evidence that is consistent with the 
idea that mental time travel into the past and into the future is intimately related (Atance & 
O’Neill, 2001; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), by showing that individual difference dimensions 
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that influence the subjective experience associated with remembering past events affect the 
experience associated with projecting oneself into the future in the same way. In the remainder of 
the discussion, we consider the specific effects of individual differences in visual imagery and 
emotion regulation in more detail. 
With regard to visual imagery, we found that, when projecting themselves into past and 
future events, people with a higher capacity for visual imagery experienced not only more visual 
details but also more details from other sensory modalities and a clearer representation of 
contextual information (time information for past events and spatial information for future 
events). As we have already noted, visual imagery seems to play a key role in memory for past 
events. Visual details can act as cues to activate information from other sensory modalities 
(Greenberg & Rubin, 2003) and this might explain why individuals who were able to form more 
vivid visual images also experienced more details from other sensory modalities. In addition, the 
time of day when a past event occurred is usually not directly stored in memory but is instead 
reconstructed from the details recalled about the event (Friedman, 1993), and it is likely that more 
visual information (e.g., about the lighting) facilitates this time reconstruction process.  
When projecting themselves into the future, participants with more vivid visual imagery 
evoked events that were more important and more intense, and they felt more emotions than 
participants with less vivid visual imagery. As we have already noted, an important function of 
visual imagery is to represent information about personal goals (Conway et al., 2004). Therefore, 
it is possible that individuals who are able to form vivid visual images have more information 
about goals available when representing future events (compared to individuals with less vivid 
imagery), thereby constructing events that are perceived as more important and that induce more 
intense emotions. By contrast, this relationship between individual differences in visual imagery 
and the personal and emotional importance of the events was not observed for past events. A 
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tentative explanation for this difference between past and future events regarding the relationship 
between visual imagery and personal/emotional importance might be that people place more 
importance on future goals than on past goals (the former being more useful to guide current 
behaviors), so that the influence of visual imagery might be easier to detect for future events. The 
finding that future events were perceived as being more important than past events is consistent 
with this interpretation, although further research is needed in order to examine this issue in more 
detail. More generally, since the tasks we used to assess mental time travel into the past and into 
the future both involved imagining a specific event, it could be argued that this imagery 
component shared by both tasks underlies the similar effects of visual imagery ability on 
representations of past and future events. However, it is difficult to explain the difference 
between past and future events regarding the relationship between visual imagery ability and the 
personal/emotional importance of the events exclusively based on the imagery component of the 
tasks. This suggests that other aspects had an influence, such as the time component. 
As for the effects of emotion regulation, our findings extend previous studies (Richards & 
Gross, 2000; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) by showing that individual differences in suppression affect 
not only the phenomenology of memory for past events but also the phenomenology associated 
with mental time travel into the future. By contrast, individual differences in reappraisal did not 
affect either the subjective experience associated with remembering past events (which is also 
consistent with the findings of Richards and Gross) or the experience associated with projecting 
oneself into the future. According to Richards and Gross (2000; see also Richards, 2004), the 
effect of suppression on memory for past events results from attentional resources being diverted 
away from ongoing events in order to continuously control one’s own emotional responses, 
thereby decreasing the extent to which individuals are able to encode the details of the events in 
memory. How can this interpretation be applied to the effect of suppression on episodic future 
Mental time travel, visual imagery, and emotion regulation 14
thinking? We see three possibilities. A first explanation can be drawn from encoding differences. 
Indeed, considering that representations of future events are constructed by assembling elements 
that are mainly extrapolations from past events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), individuals who 
habitually use suppression, and who have therefore encoded fewer details about past events in 
memory, should not only remember their past experiences in less detail, but also construct less 
detailed representations of their future. A second (not incompatible) possibility is that 
suppression is engaged during retrieval, so that it uses resources and decreases the extent to 
which individuals are able to access detailed information about the events. Remembered and 
mentally anticipated events can produce emotional responses similar to real events (e.g., Damasio 
et al., 2000), which may in turn trigger emotion regulation processes. Whenever this is the case, 
individuals who habitually use suppression to regulate their emotions would have fewer cognitive 
resources available to access detailed sensory and contextual information to reconstruct past 
events and imagine future events.  
A third explanation might be that individuals who habitually use suppression have 
developed a specific cognitive style that forces them to avoid constructing overly detailed 
representations of past and future events, in order to avoid experiencing strong emotions. Our 
finding that individuals who were high in suppression were less emotionally engaged when 
projecting themselves into past and future events might be interpreted as a clue to such a 
cognitive style. However, the present data clearly do not provide definitive evidence regarding 
the exact processes that are involved in the influence of suppression on mental time travel, so 
future studies should be conducted to examine the three hypotheses we have proposed. In 
addition, such studies should also explore whether the influence of suppression on ratings for 
phenomenal characteristics associated with mental time travel is not simply related to concerns 
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about self-presentation or self-disclosure, as these concerns have been found to correlate with 
suppression (see Gross & John, 2003). 
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 Table 1 
Rating scales used to assess the phenomenal characteristics associated with remembering/imagining past and future events 
Characteristic Brief description of rating scale 
Autonoetic consciousness Average of re-experiencing/pre-experiencing and mental time travel 
     Re-experiencing/pre-experiencing While remembering/imagining the event, I feel as though I am reliving/experiencing it: 1 = not at all, 
7 = completely 
     Mental time travel While remembering/imagining the event, I feel that I travel back/forward to the time when it 
happened/would happen: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely 
Visual details My memory/representation for this event involves visual details: 1 = none, 7 = a lot 
Other sensory details Average of sounds and smells/tastes 
     Sounds My memory/representation for this event involves sounds: 1 = none, 7 = a lot 
     Smells/tastes My memory/representation for this event involves smells/tastes: 1 = none, 7 = a lot 
Spatial context Average of location, spatial arrangement of objects, and spatial arrangement of people 
     Location My memory/representation for the location where the event takes place is: 1 = not at all clear, 7 = very 
clear 
     Spatial arrangement of objects Relative spatial arrangement of objects in my memory/representation for the event is: 1 = not at all 
clear, 7 = very clear 
     Spatial arrangement of people Relative spatial arrangement of people in my memory/representation for the event is: 1 = not at all 
clear, 7 = very clear 
Temporal information My memory/representation for the time of day when the event takes place is: 1 = not at all clear, 7 = 
very clear 
Feeling emotions While remembering/imagining the event, I feel the emotions I felt when the event occurred/would feel 
if the event occurred: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely 
Intensity When/if this event happened, my emotions were/would be: 1 = not intense, 7 = very intense 
Valence When/if this event happened, my emotions were/would be: –3 = very negative, 0 = neutral, +3 = very 
positive 
Personal importance This event is important to me (it involves an important theme or episode in my life): 1 = not at all 
important, 7 = very important 
In words While remembering/imagining the event, it comes to me in words: 1 = not at all, 7 = a lot 
Coherent story While remembering/imagining the event, it comes to me as a coherent story and not as an isolated 
scene: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely 
Visual perspective A detailed paragraph adapted from Nigro and Neisser (1983) asked participants to report whether they 
“saw” themselves in their memory (observer perspective) or saw the scene from their own perspective 
(field perspective): from –3 = entirely looking through my eyes to +3 = entirely observing myself 
from an outside point of view 
 
 Table 2 
Means and standard deviations for the ratings of past and future events 
 Past events  Future events  
 M SD  M SD t(101) 
Autonoetic consciousness 4.24 1.26  4.38 1.35 –1.41 
Visual details 5.92 0.72  5.45 0.87 5.58* 
Other sensory details 3.96 1.04  3.36 1.09 6.24* 
Spatial context 5.72 0.69  4.41 1.11 12.70* 
Temporal information 5.98 0.79  4.73 1.13 11.00* 
Feeling emotions 4.80 1.11  4.78 1.16 0.20 
Intensity 5.04 0.86  5.00 0.98 0.43 
Valence 0.85 0.97  1.46 0.89 –5.93* 
Personal importance 4.21 1.15  4.73 1.01 –5.31* 
In words 3.70 1.64  3.22 1.46 3.83* 
Coherent story 4.94 1.23  4.18 1.33 6.23* 
Visual perspective –0.82 1.55  –0.07 1.58 –5.16* 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
 Table 3 
Multiple regression analyses with the measures of visual imagery and emotion regulation strategies 
 Past events  Future events 
  Standardized β   Standardized β 
 R2 VVIQ ERQ-R ERQ-S  R2 VVIQ ERQ-R ERQ-S 
Autonoetic consciousness .06 –.01 .11 –.22*  .14 .14 .15 –.27** 
Visual details .13 .26** –.01 –.22*  .22 .26** –.06 –.37** 
Other sensory details .12 .23* .12 –.15  .17 .30** .07 –.21* 
Spatial context .11 .15 .03 –.27**  .13 .23* –.05 –.25** 
Temporal information .10 .25* –.01 –.15  .09 .13 .03 –.24* 
Feeling emotions .11 .03 .13 –.28**  .13 .20* .13 –.21* 
Intensity .10 .04 .06 –.30**  .12 .23* .05 –.21* 
Valence .05 .05 –.12 –.19  .06 .19 .03 –.08 
Personal importance .05 .11 –.05 –.17  .13 .30** –.10 –.18 
In words .05 .07 –.03 –.20*  .07 –.02 –.05 –.26** 
Coherent story .16 .12 .18 –.30**  .10 .19 .09 –.18 
Visual perspective .04 .13 –.09 .18  .04 –.09 –.04 .15 
Note: VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire; ERQ-R = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire – Reappraisal scale; ERQ-S = Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire – Suppression scale.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
 
